Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Evidence by Friend, Charles E.
University of Richmond Law Review
Volume 23 | Issue 4 Article 12
1989
Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Evidence
Charles E. Friend
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/lawreview
Part of the Evidence Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School Journals at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Richmond Law Review by an authorized editor of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.
Recommended Citation
Charles E. Friend, Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Evidence, 23 U. Rich. L. Rev. 647 (1989).
Available at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/lawreview/vol23/iss4/12
EVIDENCE*
Charles E. Friend**
I. INTRODUCTION
The past year has brought a number of cases which have supple-
mented and clarified existing Virginia law. The Court of Appeals of
Virginia has produced many of these decisions in the exercise of its
initial appellate jurisdiction, but the docket of the Supreme Court
of Virginia has also generated some important holdings in the evi-
dence area.
One supreme court case in particular, O'Dell v. Commonwealth,"
involved an unusual number of points of evidentiary interest.
These are reported in detail below. Other decisions dealt with such
diverse issues as the exclusion of witnesses, impeachment, compe-
tence, expert opinion, and, as always, the hearsay rule. These mat-
ters will be found under the appropriate headings, infra.
II. O'DELL V. COMMONWEALTH
Occasionally a single case will present an astonishing number of
evidentiary issues, thereby becoming in itself a sort of "mini-
course" in evidence law. Such a case is O'Dell, decided by the Su-
preme Court of Virginia in January 1988.
A. Appointment of Defense Experts
Defendant in O'Dell contended that he was entitled to have a
number of forensic scientists appointed to assist him in his de-
fense. He argued that the prosecution was "overloaded" with ex-
perts, and cited Ake v. Oklahoma2 in support of his contention
* Copyright 1989 Charles E. Friend.
** Adjunct Professor of Law, George Mason University; B.A., 1957, George Washington
University; J.D., 1969, College of William and Mary.
Professor Friend is a noted authority on Virginia evidence law. His detailed analysis of
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dence in Virginia.
1. 234 Va. 672, 364 S.E.2d 491 (1988).
2. 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
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that a similar number of experts should be appointed for the de-
fense. The supreme court said:
O'Dell admits none of the proposed experts would address the ques-
tion of his sanity, as in Ake v. Oklahoma. . .; they were all forensic
scientists. O'Dell had no constitutional right requiring the Common-
wealth to provide funding of this type of expert assistance ....
The trial court had the discretion to decide whether O'Dell needed
an expert or experts, and the burden is on O'Dell to show that this
discretion was abused .. . .O'Dell has not carried this burden.3
B. Scientific Evidence
1. Frye Test
Defendant contended that the electrophoresis technique, used to
test dried blood stains in the case, was not shown by the Common-
wealth to be generally accepted by the scientific community, or to
be sufficiently reliable for the results to be admitted into evidence,
in accordance with the so-called "Frye Test" used in some jurisdic-
tions to determine the admissibility of scientific evidence.4
The court stated that "[w]e see no reason to adopt the Frye test.
Even if it were the law in Virginia, the evidence was sufficient to
meet it." 5
2. "Independent" Expert Testimony as to Reliability
Defendant further argued that evidence of a test's reliability and
acceptance must come from an "independent" expert. However,
the court found that the Commonwealth's witness, a professor at
the University of California, was an "independent" expert and that
his testimony therefore met this condition.'
3. 234 Va. at 686-87, 364 S.E.2d at 499.
4. The name is derived from the case which announced it, Frye v. United States, 293 F.
1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). The "Frye test" of admissibility has been accepted by some courts
and criticized by others. See Moenssens, Admissibility of Scientific Evidence-An Alterna-
tive to the Frye Rule, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 545 (1984).
5. 234 Va. at 696, 364 S.E.2d at 504.
6. Id. at 696, 364 S.E.2d at 504.
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3. Weight of Scientific Evidence
Defendant attacked the reliability of the method used to test the
dried blood samples, the experience and competence of the exam-
iner who performed the tests, and the manner in which the tests
were conducted. The court rejected these arguments, saying
"[e]ach side introduced evidence supporting its respective posi-
tions on these issues. All three of these questions were factual is-
sues involving the weight of the evidence rather than its admissi-
bility, and were properly resolved by the jury. ' '1
C. Offer of Proof
The opinion re-states the time-honored rule that if an alleged
error in the exclusion of evidence is to be considered on appeal, an
offer of proof must be made so that the record will show what the
evidence would have been. The court stated that "[w]e will not
speculate what the answer might have been to these questions. The
answers were not proffered for the record . . . . We will not con-
sider testimony which the trial court has excluded without a
proper showing of what the testimony might have been.",,
D. Burden of Proof
1. Instruction on "Guilt Beyond a Reasonable Doubt"
The trial judge instructed the jury that a finding of guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt "does not require proof beyond all possible
doubt, nor is the Commonwealth required to disprove every con-
ceivable circumstance of innocence."9 The court found that this
language "properly balanced the instruction" and was therefore
proper.10
2. "Heightened" Burden of Proof in Capital Cases
Defendant contended that the eighth amendment creates what
he termed a "heightened reliability" standard of proof in capital
cases. The court rejected this argument, saying "The standard of
proof is beyond a reasonable doubt. There is no heightened relia-
7. Id. at 696-97, 364 S.E.2d at 505 (footnote omitted).
8. Id. at 697, 364 S.E.2d at 505.
9. Id. at 698-99, 364 S.E.2d at 506.
10. Id. at 699, 364 S.E.2d at 506.
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bility standard in a capital murder case. Nor do the cases relied
upon by O'Dell support the existence of such a standard."11
E. Impeachment-Prior Convictions
In Virginia, a witness may be impeached by showing that the
witness has been convicted of "felony or perjury,"' 2 or of a crime of
moral turpitude. 3 Under the common law, such convictions may
be shown regardless of when they occurred.
In O'Dell, the defense contended that this rule is unconstitu-
tional. Defendant argued that because Rule 609(b) of the Federal
Rules of Evidence place a 10-year restriction upon the use of prior
convictions, this same restriction also applies in Virginia. The su-
preme court rejected this contention, noting that "We have no
such rule . . . .O'Dell cites no authority indicating the admission
of such prior convictions presents constitutional issues . . . .There
is no merit in this argument."' 4
F. Hearsay
The defendant objected to the admission of the postsentence re-
port as being hearsay. The court rejected this contention also.'5
G. Prior Crimes
O'Dell argued that evidence of unadjudicated crimes and juve-
nile findings of not innocent should not have been admitted during
the penalty phase of the trial. The court said "[w]e adhere to our
consistent position that 'a trier of fact called upon to decide
whether or not to impose the death sentence is entitled to know as
much relevant information about the defendant as possible ... '
Accordingly, we reject O'Dell's contentions."' 6
11. Id. at 704, 364 S.E.2d at 509.
12. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-269 (Repl. Vol. 1983 & Cum. Supp. 1989).
13. See, e.g., Hackman v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 710, 261 S.E.2d 555 (1980).
14. 234 Va. at 700, 364 S.E.2d at 507.
15. Id. at 701-02, 364 S.E.2d at 507-08.
16. Id. at 700, 364 S.E.2d at 507 (citing Beaver v. Commonwealth, 232 Va. 521, 352 S.E.2d
342, cert. denied, 107 S.Ct. 3277 (1987) (juvenile offenses and unadjudicated criminal activ-
ity held admissible in penalty phase of capital murder case)).
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H. Privilege
1. Self-Incrimination
O'Dell had arranged for the presence of a witness, Pruett, but
later asked that Pruett be excused. The defendant attempted to
justify this action by claiming that Pruett had a fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination, and therefore could not have
been compelled to testify. The court rejected this contention, not-
ing that section 19-2-270 of the Code of Virginia (the "Code")
would have compelled Pruett to testify.17
Although it was not mentioned by the court, the defendant's
contention might well have been rejected for another reason as
well. It has been held in Virginia (although in another context)
that it may not be assumed that a witness will refuse to testify if
called. It appears that the witness would have to be actually called
to the stand, and would have to actually assert the privilege, before
such an argument could have any force. 8
2. Priest-Penitent
O'Dell alleged that a third person (Pruett) had confessed to a
certain minister that he (Pruett) had committed the murder with
which O'Dell was charged. O'Dell claimed he had been precluded
from calling the minister by the priest-penitent privilege set forth
in section 19.2-271.3 of the Code. This section provides that no
member of the clergy "shall be required in giving testimony as a
witness in any criminal action to disclose any information commu-
nicated to him by the accused in a confidential manner." '19
The supreme court opinion points out that the section limits the
privilege to information communicated to the minister by the ac-
cused. Since the accused was O'Dell, not Pruett, the alleged con-
fession of Pruett to the minister would not be privileged in
Virginia.20
17. 234 Va. at 704, 364 S.E.2d at 704. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-270 states:
In a criminal prosecution, other than for perjury, or in an action on a penal statute,
evidence shall not be given against the accused of any statement made by him as a
witness upon a legal examination, unless such statement was made when examined as
a witness in his own behalf.
VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-270 (Cum. Supp. 1989).
18. See Scaggs v. Commonwealth, 5 Va. App. 1, 359 S.E.2d 830 (1987).
19. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-271.3 (Repl. Vol. 1983 & Cum. Supp. 1989).
20. 234 Va. at 704-05, 364 S.E.2d at 509. VA. ConE ANN. § 8.01-400, which makes any
6511989] EVIDENCE
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I. Other Evidentiary Issues
The decision touches upon other evidentiary and procedural is-
sues raised by the defense on appeal, many of them related to the
penalty phase of the trial. Those who wish to complete the mini-
course on evidence may refer to the opinion in the case."
III. EXCLUSION OF WITNESSES-VIOLATION OF EXCLUSION ORDER
For anyone who has ever wondered what happens when a wit-
ness violates the court's order excluding all witnesses from the
courtroom, the recent case of Bennett v. Commonwealth22 will be
of interest. In that case the Supreme Court of Virginia ruled that
the witness exclusion statute23 does not automatically disqualify a
witness from testifying merely because the witness has remained in
the courtroom in violation of an exclusion order. The court noted
that "the purpose of excluding the witnesses from the courtroom
is, of course, to deprive a later witness of the opportunity of shap-
ing his testimony to correspond to that of an earlier one, ' 24 and
that the trial judge has discretion to decide whether such a witness
who violates an exclusion order should nevertheless be permitted
to testify.25
The factors to be considered by this trial judge in determining
whether the witness should be allowed to testify despite the viola-
tion include (1) whether there was intentional impropriety by a
party and (2) whether prejudice resulted.2" Taking these factors
into consideration, the court held that it was not an abuse of dis-
cretion in this case to allow the witness in question to testify.
communication of this type privileged, applies only in civil cases. There is no rule of evi-
dence which makes such conversations privileged in criminal cases, except as provided in §
19.2-271.3. Whether the rules of the religious denomination of which the minister was a
member would have permitted the revelation of the alleged confession, and whether the
minister in question, or any other clergyman, would be willing to violate the laws of the
clergyman's church, is another matter.
21. Notwithstanding all of the assignments of error, O'Dell's conviction and death sen-
tence were affirmed by the supreme court.
22. 236 Va. 448, 374 S.E.2d 303 (1988).
23. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-265.1 (Repl. Vol. 1983 & Cum. Supp. 1989).
24. 236 Va. at 465, 374 S.E.2d at 314 (citing Huddleston v. Commonwealth, 191 Va. 400,
61 S.E.2d 276 (1950)).
25. This principle has been stated in other cases, e.g., Brickhouse v. Commonwealth, 208
Va. 533, 159 S.E.2d 611 (1968).
26. 236 Va. at 465, 374 S.E.2d at 314.
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IV. IMPEACHMENT
A. Bias
Several 1988 Virginia cases dealt with the issue of showing bias
to impeach a witness. First, the Supreme Court of Virginia twice
during 1988 reiterated the well-established rule that bias is never"collateral," meaning that if the bias is denied, extrinsic evidence
to show the bias is always admissible. Therefore, anything which
tends to show bias may be drawn out on cross-examination.28
The past year also brought a reminder that it is irrelevant that
the basis of the bias is legal or illegal, moral or immoral, laudable
or reprehensible. What matters is that the fact, whatever it may
be, may cause the witness to be biased for or against a party. Thus,
it was held in Henning v. Thomas29 that it could be shown that a
medical witness was part of a nationwide network of doctors who
offer themselves as witnesses for medical malpractice plaintiffs.30
The point of such a showing, of course, is not that it is somehow
illegal or immoral to act exclusively as a witness for the plaintiff,
but that constantly testifying exclusively on behalf of plaintiffs in-
dicates a possible bias toward the plaintiff's side of a given litiga-
tion, including the present one.
B. Juvenile Convictions
The use or attempted use of juvenile convictions, usually re-
ferred to as "juvenile adjudications," to impeach a witness has re-
sulted in some uncertainty in the Virginia law. The issue arose
during 1988 in the case of Scott v. Commonwealth.31 Although the
references to this problem in Scott are dictum because the court of
appeals found that the issue was "not properly presented" to it on
appeal, 2 the matter needs clarification, and the comments in Scott
make it appropriate to include the subject in this review.
27. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Sonney, 236 Va. 482, 374 S.E.2d 71 (1988); Henning v.
Thomas, 235 Va. 181, 366 S.E.2d 109 (1988). By comparison, extrinsic evidence of prior
inconsistent statements is not admissible to impeach if the subject matter of the statement
was "collateral"-i.e., not important to the issues of the case.
28. 235 Va. at 188, 366 S.E.2d at 113 (citing Henson v. Commonwealth, 165 Va. 821, 183
S.E. 435 (1936); Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Birchfield, 105 Va. 809, 54 S.E. 879 (1906)).
29. 235 Va. 181, 366 S.E.2d 109 (1988).
30. Id. at 187-89, 366 S.E.2d at 112-13.
31. 7 Va. App. 252, 372 S.E.2d 771 (1988).
32. Id. at 261, 372 S.E.2d at 776.
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Much of the confusion over the propriety of the use of juvenile
adjudications to impeach arises because of a failure to identify the
specific purpose for which the juvenile adjudication is being of-
fered. In order to reach the proper result, it must be determined
whether the witness's juvenile record is being offered (1) as a prior
conviction to impeach the witness's character for veracity, or (2) to
show that the witness is biased.
If the juvenile adjudication is being offered as a "general attack
on credibility," i.e., as a prior conviction to impeach the witness's
character for veracity, it is inadmissible.33 However, if the juvenile
record is being offered to show that the witness is biased, it may be
shown. 4
This rule is the result of the very strong policy of the law which
regards it as the inalienable right of a party to show that an oppo-
nent's witness is biased. So absolute is this right to show bias that
it takes precedence over other rules of evidence and even over stat-
utory enactments. This rule reaches its zenith in criminal cases,
where it has been held by the United States Supreme Court that
the right of the defendant to show that the prosecution's witnesses
are biased has a constitutional foundation, and that it is therefore
reversible error to limit cross-examination as to juvenile offenses to
show bias, even though a statute protects such matters from
disclosure. 5
C. Prior Accusations-Sex Crime Cases
American courts have struggled with the question of the admissi-
bility in sex crime cases of evidence that the complaining witness
has made false accusations of such crimes in the past. The Su-
preme Court of Virginia recently addressed this question in the
case of Clinebell v. Commonwealth."
Section 18.2-67.7 of the Code prohibits the introduction in sex
crime cases of "general reputation or opinion evidence of the com-
plaining witness's unchaste character or prior sexual conduct. '37 In
33. See Kiracofe v. Commonwealth, 198 Va. 833, 97 S.E.2d 14 (1957); see also 7 Va. App.
at 261, 372 S.E.2d at 776 (dictum).
34. See, e.g., Townes v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 307, 325 n.6, 362 S.E.2d 650 n.6 (1987).
35. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974).
36. 235 Va. 319, 368 S.E.2d 263 (1988), rev'g in part, 3 Va. App. 362, 349 S.E.2d 676
(1986).
37. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-67.7(A) (Repl. Vol. 1988).
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Clinebell, the supreme court ruled that while the statute prohibits
introduction of general reputation or opinion evidence as to char-
acter, it does not prohibit the introduction of evidence of prior
false accusations by the complaining witness, because this is not"conduct" within the prohibition of section 18.2-67.7 of the Code.
[A] majority of jurisdictions that have considered the issue hold that
evidence of prior false accusations is admissible to impeach the com-
plaining witness' credibility or as substantive evidence tending to
prove that the instant offense did not occur .... Consequently, in
a sex crime case, the complaining witness may be cross-examined
about prior false accusations, and if the witness denies making the
statement, the defense may submit proof of such charges."'
The court noted that such prior accusations are admissible, not
as an attack on character per se, but to impeach the witness's cred-,
ibility by showing the probability that the current allegations are
also fabrications.3 9 Having heard evidence of these prior false accu-
sations, the jury may properly infer that the present allegations are
also false.40 The court observed, however, that the prior accusa-
tions are admissible only if the trial judge makes a "threshold de-
termination that a reasonable probability of falsity exists." 1
V. COMPETENCE-CHILDREN
In Virginia, there is no minimum age which must be attained
before a child is competent to testify. "A child is competent to tes-
tify if it possesses the capacity to observe events, to recollect and
communicate them, and has the ability to understand questions
and to frame and make intelligent answers, with a consciousness of
the duty to speak the truth. ' 42 Within these parameters, the deter-
mination of the competency of a child to testify is left to the dis-
cretion of the trial judge, who will not be reversed in the absence
of "manifest error."4 3
There is a considerable amount of language in the Virginia cases
to the effect that before a child may testify, it must be shown that
38. 235 Va. at 324-25, 368 S.E.2d at 265-66.
39. Id. at 325, 368 S.E.2d at 266.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Cross v. Commonwealth, 195 Va. 62, 64, 77 S.E.2d 447, 449 (1953).
43. Carpenter v. Commonwealth, 186 Va. 851, 864, 44 S.E.2d 419, 425 (1947).
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the child has an understanding and appreciation of the sanctity of
an oath.4" This view, which has been criticized as "manifestly inap-
propriate,' 45 may not be an accurate statement of current Virginia
evidence law. In the 1988 case of Durant v. Commonwealth,4 the
trial judge declined to permit the defendant's seven-year-old son to
testify, in part because the judge found that the child did not un-
derstand the meaning of the oath. The court of appeals, reversing,
said "[tihe fact that a child cannot define oath or state the nature
and purpose of an oath does not necessarily disqualify him as a
witness; many intelligent adults cannot give such a definition or
statement but are competent as witnesses. '41
The court of appeals ruled that the trial court's voir dire of the
child demonstrated that, although the child did not understand
the oath as such, he did understand what it meant to tell the truth.
Consequently, the court of appeals held that the trial judge abused
his discretion by refusing to permit the witness to testify.48
This same position has been taken in other courts. For example,
in Oliver v. United States,49 the Fourth Circuit found that a thir-
teen-year-old witness was competent to testify, even though the
witness stated that he did not understand the nature of the oath.50
The Fourth Circuit reached this result because it appeared that
the witness understood that he was expected to tell the truth when
sworn to do so. The Court of Appeals of Virginia, citing Oliver,
took the same position in Durant.5 1
It therefore appears that, when the competency of a child is to
be determined, the focus of the trial judge's inquiry should be
upon whether the child in fact understands the nature of the truth,
and the necessity of telling it, rather than upon the child's ability
or inability to "give a definition of an oath in ... technical
terms. 52
44. See, e.g., Mullins v. Commonwealth, 174 Va. 472, 5 S.E.2d 499 (1939).
45. See, e.g., MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 62 (3d ed. 1984).
46. 7 Va. App. 454, 375 S.E.2d 396 (1988).
47. Id. at 467, 375 S.E.2d at 402 (quoting 81 Am. JUR. 2D Witnesses § 89 (1976)).
48. Id. at 467, 375 S.E.2d at 402.
49. 267 F. 544 (4th Cir. 1920).
50. Id.
51. Va. App. at 467, 375 S.E.2d at 402.
52. 267 F. at 547.
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VI. EXPERT WITNESS
A. Foundation of Expert Opinion
1. Proper Foundation
There is a common misapprehension that once an expert witness
is qualified as such, the expert is then permitted to render opinions
at will. Nothing could be farther from the truth. In order for the
opinion to be admissible, the opinion must be based upon a proper
foundation. In recent years, much appellate attention has been de-
voted to the question of what constitutes a proper foundation for
the rendition of expert opinion.
Although at common law an expert witness could base an opin-
ion only upon personal knowledge or a hypothetical question, in
Virginia today there are several other bases of opinion which may
be proper in a given case. For example, the passage of section 8.01-
401.1 of the Code has made it possible for expert witnesses in civil
cases to base an opinion upon sources which are themselves inad-
missible in evidence. 53 The Supreme Court of Virginia has ruled
that, even in criminal cases, an expert who lacks personal knowl-
edge of the case at bar may base an opinion upon the witness's
prior experience in similar matters.54
The Court of Appeals of Virginia has also said that an expert
witness, even in a criminal case, may base an opinion upon sources
of information, such as trade publications, consulted before the
trial, if such sources are normally relied upon by others in the
field. This principle, first announced by the court of appeals, in
Kern v. Commonwealth55 in 1986, was reiterated in 1988 by the
same court in Funderburk v. Commonwealth .5  The Supreme
Court of Virginia does not appear to have passed upon the point,
and in view of the supreme court's refusal in Simpson v. Common-
wealth5 7 to extend the effect of section 8.01-401.1 of the Code to
criminal cases,58 it will be interesting to see what the result will be
if and when the higher court is squarely presented with point at
53. For a full discussion, with case citations, of this subject see C. FRIEND, THE LAW OF
EVIDENCE IN VIRGINIA § 217 (3d ed. 1988).
54. See, e.g., Cantrell v. Commonwealth, 229 Va. 387, 394-95, 329 S.E.2d 22, 27-28 (1985);
Simpson v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 557, 565-66, 318 S.E.2d 386, 391 (1984).
55. 2 Va. App. 84, 341 S.E.2d 397 (1986).
56. 6 Va. App. 334, 368 S.E.2d 290 (1988).
57. 227 Va. 557, 318 S.E.2d 386 (1984).
58. Id. at 565-66, 318 S.E.2d at 391.
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issue in the court of appeal's ruling in Kern and Funderburk.
2. Proper Foundation-Trial Judge's Determination
Whether the opinion has indeed been based upon a proper foun-
dation is a matter for the trial judge. The Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia in early 1989 reminded us that, although under section 8.01-
401.1 of the Code an expert witness in a civil case may express an
opinion without initially disclosing the basis therefore, and may
base such opinion on otherwise inadmissible information, never-
theless upon proper objection, the trial court must determine
whether the factors required to be included in formulating the
opinion were actually used.59 If all such factors were not utilized,
the court should exclude the opinion. Therefore, where there is, as
the supreme court put it, a "missing variable" in the foundation of
the expert's opinion, the opinion is inadmissible.6 0
3. Personal Knowledge-Examination-Similarity of Conditions
Although an expert witness is permitted to base an opinion upon
an examination of the person, place, or item at issue, that exami-
nation must be conducted under the proper conditions if its results
are to be the basis for an opinion. A recent case notes that if an
expert's opinion is to be based upon a personal examination or in-
spection of the location of the incident, it must be shown that the
condition of the location at the time of the inspection was the
same as, or substantially similar to, its condition at the time of the
incident.61
59. Swiney v. Overby, 237 Va. 231, 233, 377 S.E.2d 372, 374 (1989).
60. Id. (citing Gaalaas v. Morrison, 233 Va. 148, 353 S.E.2d 898 (1987); Mary Washington
Hosp. v. Gibson, 228 Va. 95, 319 S.E.2d 741 (1984)).
61. Runyon v. Geldner, 237 Va. 460, 464, 377 S.E.2d 456, 458-59 (1989) (expert's state-
ment that conditions shown in a photograph taken several months after the incident were
the same as conditions at time of expert's inspection a year later was not proper founda-
tion); see Mary Washington Hosp. v. Gibson, 228 Va. 95, 319 S.E.2d 741 (1984) (because
conditions could have changed following accident and before inspection, expert's testimony
too speculative); see also Wise Terminal Co. v. McCormick, 104 Va. 400, 51 S.E. 731 (1905);
Richmond Passenger & Power Co. v. Racks, 101 Va. 487, 44 S.E. 709 (1903) (absent proof of
similarity of conditions, opinion of expert as to speed and stopping distances or railway cars
inadmissible).
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4. Experiments-Similarity of Conditions
The same principle has generally been applied to testimony
about experiments conducted by witnesses, expert or otherwise;
conditions at the time of the experiment must be shown to be simi-
lar to those at the time of the incident, or the evidence is inadmis-
sible.6 2 However, in Pope v. Commonwealth,63 the Supreme Court
of Virginia upheld the admission of evidence of an experiment to
test the time required to run a particular route. The accused had
assigned error on the grounds that the evidence should have been
excluded because of physical differences between the police officer
who conducted the experimental run and the person who suppos-
edly ran the route in the actual incident, but the supreme court
stated that the differences affected the weight of the evidence, not
its admissibility.4
VII. HEARSAY
As might be expected, the hearsay rule occupied a considerable
amount of space in the cases of the past year. In particular, the
Virginia appellate courts dealt with such diverse matters as com-
puter printouts, official written statements, identification testi-
mony, and the co-conspirator rule.
A. Computer Printouts as Evidence
1. Generally
Computer printouts have been held to be hearsay, at least when
they repeat recorded human observations.6" However, printouts
have previously been held admissible in Virginia under the busi-
ness records exception to the hearsay rule."6
However, there are many types of computer printouts, and the
differences can be important. For example, a printout of state-
62. See, e.g., Featherall v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 219 Va. 949, 252 S.E.2d 358
(1979); Bunn v. Norfolk, F&P, Ry. 217 Va. 45, 225 S.E.2d 375 (1976); Habers v. Madigan,
213 Va. 485, 193 S.E.2d 653 (1973).
63. 234 Va. 114, 360 S.E.2d 352 (1987).
64. Id. at 126, 360 S.E.2d at 359; cf. Washington v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 535, 323
S.E.2d 577 (1984) (photograph admissible when showing condition different from that de-
scribed by witnesses, if differences sufficiently explained to avoid jury confusion).
65. See Penny v. Commonwealth, 6 Va. App. 494, 370 S.E.2d 314 (1988).
66. See Frye v. Commonwealth, 231 Va. 370, 345 S.E.2d 267 (1986).
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ments in a medical record would be subject to the strictures of the
hearsay rule if offered to prove the truth of the statements; a
printout of this type would be admissible only if found so under
the business records rule or some other recognized hearsay
exception.
2. Special Types of Printouts-"Call Trap" Equipment
Last year, the court of appeals was called upon to decide the
applicability of the hearsay rule to so-called "call trap" printouts.
These printouts are produced by "call trap" equipment which,
when attached to a given telephone line, will reveal the point of
origin of incoming telephone calls. In Penny v. Commonwealth,7
the court of appeals ruled that such printouts, produced as they
are by sophisticated electronic equipment for a specific purpose,
should be treated more like scientific test results, admissible with-
out reference to the hearsay rule. The admissibility of this type of
printout is, however, subject to a showing that the specific equip-
ment in use was reliable. 8 The same result would, presumably, ap-
ply to readouts from similar types of equipment, such as pen regis-
ters and other "black boxes" designed to provide information to
the trained user.6
B. Official Written Statements
The hearsay exception for official written statements reared its
head again in the 1988 case of Smith v. Woodlawn Construction
Co.7" This rule, although codified in part in Virginia,71 is still sub-
ject to several common law requirements which, although not in-
cluded in the statutory language, are nevertheless applied by the
courts. One of these is the requirement that the rule permits the
admission of only those portions of the official record which are
statements of fact; another is the provision that such records are
admissible only if the recording public official has first-hand
67. 6 Va. App. 494, 370 S.E.2d 314.
68. Id. at 494, 370 S.E.2d at 314.
69. As to pen registers (devices which reveal the number being dialed from the target
telephone), see Harmon v. Commonwealth, 209 Va. 574, 166 S.E.2d 232 (1969), cited in 6
Va. App. 494, 370 S.E.2d 314.
70. 235 Va. 424, 368 S.E.2d 699 (1988).
71. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-389, -390 (Repl. Vol. 1984). There are many Virginia
statutes which make public records of various types admissible in Virginia. For a more com-
plete listing, see Friend, Documentary Evidence (Professional Programs Associates, 1989).
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knowledge of the transaction being entered in the records.72 Both
of these requirements were applied by the supreme court in Smith,
where the supreme court ruled that evidence of the value of a par-
cel of land contained in a tax assessor's file was not admissible in
evidence.7 1
The application in Smith of the requirement that the public offi-
cial making the record entry have first-hand knowledge of the mat-
ters being recorded is particularly interesting. This requirement is
not often enforced, which is perhaps just as well in view of the fact
that in today's complex society very few public officials are actually
going to have personal knowledge of matters described in the
records. Nevertheless, it is a part of the common-law hearsay ex-
ception for public records, and obviously continues to be applied in
Virginia, notwithstanding the omission of any such language from
the statues.
C. Identification Testimony
Although evidence of pretrial identifications necessarily involves
hearsay questions, the general principles regarding the admissibil-
ity of out-of-court and in-court identifications go beyond the hear-
say problem. Nevertheless, it is convenient to treat the subject
under the heading of the hearsay rule, since hearsay issues are al-
most always present when such testimony is offered.74
72. See, e.g., Taylor v. Maritime Overseas Corp., 224 Va. 562, 299 S.E.2d 340 (1983); Ed-
wards v. Jackson, 210 Va. 450, 171 S.E.2d 854 (1970).
73. 235 Va. at 431, 368 S.E.2d at 703-04.
74. The applicable principles have been articulated in Virginia in a number of cases, in-
cluding several decided within the past year. These principles may be stated as follows:
1. Evidence of out-of-court identifications may be admitted if:
a. The identification was not unduly suggestive or
b. The procedure was unduly suggestive, but the identification is so reliable that
there is no substantial likelihood of misidentification.
Hill v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 683, 693, 347 S.E.2d 913, 918 (1986), cited in Miller v.
Commonwealth, 7 Va. App. 367, 373, 373 S.E.2d 721, 724 (1988).
2. The reliability of an unduly suggestive out-of-court identification must be consid-
ered in light of the "totality of the circumstances."
Miller v. Commonwealth, 7 Va. App. 367, 373 S.E.2d 721 (1988) (citing Neil v. Biggers, 409
U.S. 188 (1972)).
3. Factors to be considered in evaluating the likelihood of misidentification as the
result of an unduly suggestive procedure included:
a. The opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime;
b. The witness' degree of attention;
c. The accuracy of the witness's prior description of the criminal;
d. The level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation, and
e. The length of time between the crime and the confrontation.
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
Defense claims that an identification procedure has been "un-
duly suggestive" frequently arise when only a single photograph of
the defendant has been shown to the identifying witness. Such sin-
gle-photo identifications have frequently been found by the courts
to be unduly suggestive.75 Nevertheless, the courts have sometimes
used the principles discussed above to admit this type of identifi-
cation evidence.76
D. The Co-Conspirator Rule
Still another hearsay exception which received judicial attention
in 1988 was the so-called "co-conspirator rule," which makes state-
ments of one conspirator, when made during and in furtherance of
the conspiracy, admissible against all other conspirators, including
those who were not present when the statement was made.7
One of the more troublesome aspects of this rule has been the
question of how the existence of the conspiracy itself can be estab-
lished, so that the hearsay exception can be applied. Not less than
three court of appeals cases dealt with this problem in 1988. In
these opinions, the court of appeals held that the conspiracy must
be established by evidence other than the hearsay statements of
the co-conspirators themselves.7 8 Otherwise, said the court, the
hearsay would "lift itself by its own bootstraps to the level of com-
petent evidence. '79
Thus, a party seeking to introduce the statements of conspira-
tors under the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule must
first produce some evidence to establish that a conspiracy existed;
only then will the statements become admissible.
7 Va. App. at 373, 373 S.E,2d at 724; Wise v. Commonwealth, 6 Va. App. 178, 367 S.E.2d
197 (1988) (both quoting Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972)).
75. See, e.g., Wise v. Commonwealth, 6 Va. App. 178, 367 S.E.2d 197 (1988).
76. E.g., Miller, 7 Va. App. 367, 373, S.E.2d 721 (1988).
NOTE: Even if the out-of-court identification itself is inadmissible, an in-court identifica-
tion may still be made if the origin of the in-court identification is independent of the im-
proper out-of-court identification procedure. Hill v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 683, 347
S.E.2d 913 (1986), cited in Miller v. Commonwealth, 7 Va. App. 367, 373 S.E.2d 721 (1988).
77. For a more complete discussion and case citations, see C. FRIEND, THE LAW OF Evi-
DENCE IN VIRGINIA § 259 (3d ed. 1988).
78. Poole v. Commonwealth, 7 Va. App. 510, 375 S.E.2d 371 (1988); Stultz v. Common-
wealth, 6 Va. App. 439, 369 S.E.2d 215 (1988); see Cirios v. Commonwealth, 7 Va. App. 292,
373 S.E.2d 164 (1988).
79. Pool v. Commonwealth, 7 Va. App. 510, 375 S.E.2d 371 (1988) (citing United States v.
Gresko, 632 F.2d 1113, 1131 (4th Cir. 1980) (quoting Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60,
74-75 (1942)).
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